Platform owner entry and innovation in complementary markets

evidence from Intel
  • 36 Pages
  • 2.20 MB
  • 5976 Downloads
  • English
by
National Bureau of Economic Research , Cambridge, Mass
Intel Corporation, Compet
StatementAnnabelle Gawer, Rebecca Henderson.
SeriesNBER working paper series -- working paper 11852., Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 11852.
ContributionsHenderson, Rebecca., National Bureau of Economic Research.
The Physical Object
Pagination36 p. ;
ID Numbers
Open LibraryOL17628623M
OCLC/WorldCa62928274

2 Journal of Economics & Management Strategy to complementary markets, and in the consequences of platform owner entry for innovation. Despite its importance, this. Request PDF | Platform Owner Entry and Innovation in Complementary Markets: Evidence from Intel | "This paper explores Intel's strategy with respect to complements.

We find that, as the literature. Platform Owner Entry and Innovation in Complementary Markets: Evidence from Intel. Annabelle Gawer. Intel's entry decisions are shaped by the belief that it does not have the capabilities to enter all possible markets, and thus that it must encourage widespread entry despite the fact that potential entrants (rationally) fear Intel's ability Cited by: "Platform Owner Entry and Innovation in Complementary Markets: Evidence from Intel," NBER Working PapersNational Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

References listed on IDEAS as. Platform Owner Entry and Innovation in Complementary Markets: Evidence from Intel. By Annabelle Gawer and Rebecca Henderson. Download PDF (2 MB) Abstract.

This paper draws on a detailed history of Intel's strategy with respect to the complementary markets for microprocessors to explore the usefulness of the current theoretical literature for Author: Annabelle Gawer and Rebecca Henderson.

Platform Owner Entry and Innovation in Complementary Markets: Evidence from Intel Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp.Spring Number of pages: 34 Posted: 18 Jan   We study how platform owners’ decision to enter complementary markets affects innovation in the ecosystem surrounding the platform.

Despite heated debates on the behavior of platform owners toward complementors, relatively little is known about the mechanisms linking platform owners’ entry and complementary innovation. Research Summary. This paper studies the impact of platform‐owner entry threat on complementors in platform‐based markets.

We examine how app developers on the Android mobile platform adjust innovation efforts (rate and direction) and value‐capture strategies in response to the threat of Google's entry into their markets. Platform Leadership: How Intel, Microsoft, and Cisco Drive Industry Innovation, Boston, MA: Harvard Business Sc hool Press.

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• Gawer, A., and Henderson, R. “Platform Owner Entry and Innovation in Complementary Markets: Evidence from Intel,” Journal of Economics & Management. markets on complementary innovation. Entry into complementary markets, as in the case of Photos, is a popular yet not well-understood phenomenon.

The landmark Microsoft antitrust trial sparked considerable interest of organizations, researchers, and policy makers regarding the behavior of platform owners toward their complementary markets (e.g.

Gawer, Annabelle and Henderson, R () Platform Owner Entry and Innovation in Complementary Markets: Evidence from Intel Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 16 (1). Get this from a library. Platform owner entry and innovation in complementary markets: evidence from Intel.

[Annabelle Gawer; Rebecca Henderson; National Bureau of Economic Research.]. BibTeX @ARTICLE{Gawer07platformowner, author = {Annabelle Gawer and Rebecca Henderson}, title = {Platform Owner Entry and Innovation in Complementary Markets: Evidence from Intel}, journal = {Journal of Economics & Management Strategy}, year = {}, pages = {}}.

Platform Owner Entry and Innovation in Complementary Markets: Evidence from Intel By Annabelle Gawer and Rebecca M.

Henderson. Platform Owner Entry and Innovation in Complementary Markets: Evidence from Intel Annabelle Gawer and Rebecca Henderson NBER Working Paper No. December JEL No. L0 ABSTRACT This paper draws on a detailed history of Intel's strategy with respect to the complementary markets.

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX Document Object Identifier (DOI): /w Published: Gawer, Annabelle and Rebecca Henderson. "Platform Owner Entry and Innovation in Complementary Markets: Evidence from Intel." Journal of Economics and Management Strat 1 (spring ): Platform Owner Entry and Innovation in Complementary Markets: Evidence from Intel.

Intel's entry decisions are shaped by the belief that it does not have the capabilities to enter all possible markets, and thus that it must encourage widespread entry despite the fact that potential entrants (rationally) fear Intel's ability to “squeeze.

Gawer, Annabelle, and Rebecca M. Henderson. "Platform Owner Entry and Innovation in Complementary Markets: Evidence from Intel." Journal of Economics & Management Strat no.

The textbook explanation for why a platform owner should provide some of these products itself is that these complementary applications help solve a. Threat of platform‐owner entry and complementor responses: Evidence from the mobile app market 23 April | Strategic Management Journal, Vol.

40, No. 9 Supplier, Tailor, and Facilitator: Typology of Platform Business Models. outsiders access the platform, and thus open up markets for complementary innovation around the platform, and giving up some control over the platform itself.

Part of the difficulty in distinguishing these approaches is that they often coincide in theory and practice. If the platform owner. platform owner and ecosystem partners can share in order to create“complementary ” products and services. By complementary, we mean that these innovations add functionality or add assets to the platform and make the whole system increasingly useful and valuable.

The more complements there are. Gawer A, Henderson R () Platform Owner Entry and Innovation in Complementary Markets: Evidence from Intel, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16 (1) pp. Wiley DOI: /jx.

A 'read' is counted each time someone views a publication summary (such as the title, abstract, and list of authors), clicks on a figure, or views or downloads the full-text.

Platform Owner Entry and Innovation in Complementary Markets: Evidence from Intel Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Vol. 16, No. 1 Competing in the Era of Emergent Architecture: The Case of Packaged Software Industry.

Gawer and R. Henderson, “Platform Owner Entry and Innovation in Complementary Markets: Evidence from Intel,” Journal of Economics and Management Strat no. 1 (): This statement is based on primary data collected by one of the authors as part of an ongoing study of entry and survival in the iPhone apps space.

See T. Bresnahan and S. Greenstein, “Technological Competition and the Structure of the Computer Industry,” Journal of Industrial Econom no.

Description Platform owner entry and innovation in complementary markets PDF

1 (March ): ; A. Gawer and R. Henderson, “Platform Owner Entry and Innovation in Complementary Markets: Evidence From Intel,” Journal of Economics & Management Strat no.

Research Summary: Platform owners sometimes enter complementors' product spaces and compete against data from to study Amazon's entry pattern into third‐party sellers' product spaces, we find that Amazon is more likely to target successful product spaces. We also find that Amazon is less likely to enter product spaces that require greater seller efforts to grow.

We study platform owner’s decision to enter the market complementary to its platform with its own rival complement, and the consequences of such an entry on complementors’ innovation behavior.

We ask: if a platform owner like Google releases an app for its Android platform, does it keep app developers from innovating in the future. We investigate two mechanisms that suggest entry to.

The book contributed massively to open my eyes on the genesis of platforms, their different shapes and their strategies that dominate the market up to The book is a collection of contributions from the most imminent platform thinkers of our time.

Throughout the book, we build an evolving view enlightened from different s: 2. 1. Platforms, markets and innovation: an introduction Annabelle Gawer performed by platform owners, and innovation on complements or modules, performed by complementors?

What kinds of cations of all of this for competition and innovation in services?

Details Platform owner entry and innovation in complementary markets PDF

This book uncovers many such questions – and off ers some answers. competition. It would thus seem that if platform owners seek to improve consumer satisfaction with the overall platform ecosystem, they should target the product spaces of underperforming complementors.

Empirical evidence on platform owners’ entry strategies with respect to complementary markets is scant.This paper studies two fundamentally distinct approaches to opening a technology platform and their different impacts on innovation.

One approach is to grant access to a platform and thereby open up markets for complementary components around the platform. Another approach is to give up control over the platform itself.